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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 





     Plaintiff James Aguiar appeals an order granting summary judgment to 
the 
Morgan Corporation on retaliation claims made under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C.  2000e), the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (42 U.S.C.  1981), 
and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (43 P.S.  951).  Aguiar contends Morgan 
unlawfully 
took adverse employment action against him because he made a statement on 
behalf of a 
black co-worker who filed a complaint of race discrimination with the 
Reading-Berks 
Human Relations Council (RBHRC).  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for 
the defendants because plaintiff failed to respond to Morgan's allegation 
that he 
presented no evidence of an adverse employment action or a causal 
connection between 
the alleged harassment and the termination. (District Court March 2, 2000 
Opinion at 9) 
("Without any such evidence it is impossible for a jury to find the 
plaintiff's retaliation 
argument to have merit; therefore, summary judgment must be granted.").  
     We will affirm.      
                               I. 
     We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1291.  Our review of a grant 
of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Cardenas v. Massey, No. 00-5225, 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22372, at 
*4 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2001).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 
"mandates the entry of 
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 
against a party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that 
party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial."  Id.  (quoting 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). 
                              II. 
     At issue is whether summary judgment was properly granted on Aguiar's 
retaliation claim.  To establish a prima facie case of unlawful 
retaliation under Title VII, 
 1981, and the PHRA , a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she 
engaged in 
activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse 
employment action after 
or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link 
exists between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.  Weston v. 
Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001);  Robinson v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 120 
F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).  We conclude there is sufficient evidence of the 
first two 
elements, but not enough evidence of the requisite causal connection, and 
therefore we 
will affirm the District Court's judgment.    
a.  Aguiar engaged in protected activity 
     In October or November of 1996, Aguiar went to the Reading-Berks 
Human 
Relations Council and made a statement on behalf of a black co-worker who 
had filed a 
complaint of race discrimination.  Thus, we hold that the record contains 
a sufficient 
showing that Aguiar engaged in a protected activity.  See Abramson v. 
William Patterson 
College of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing acceptable 
indicia of 
protected conduct in the ADEA and Title VII contexts). 
b.  Aguiar suffered adverse employment action 
     Although the actual date and cause of termination is in dispute, both 
parties agree 
Aguiar was fired from his position of production employee at Morgan 
Corporation in 
July 1997.  Aguiar's termination therefore fulfills the second prong of 
the prima facie 
case for a retaliation claim. 
c.  Insufficient evidence of  causal link 
     On appeal, Aguiar alleges he presented sufficient evidence of a 
causal connection 
because in his deposition he asserted that (1) a group of Morgan employees 
threatened 
him with adverse employment action one and a half weeks after he gave a 
statement 
regarding racial remarks to the human relations council in 1996; (2) one 
person from that 
same group fired him over the telephone on July 7, 1997 when he requested 
more time 
off; and (3) a Morgan human relations employee informed him he was not 
getting a 
requested transfer because he was being "blackballed."  
     We see no merit in Aguiar's contention that these alleged events 
establish the 
requisite causal connection "by way of a threat and the implementation of 
the threat."  
(Appellant's Brief at 16).  We have stated that the existence of a causal 
link "must be 
considered with a careful eye to the specific facts and circumstances 
encountered." 
Farrell v. Planter's Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Evidence 
probative of a causal link can be inferred from evidence "gleaned from the 
record as a 
whole." Id. at 281 ("temporal proximity or antagonism merely provides an 
evidentiary 
basis from which an inference can be drawn") (citations and alterations 
omitted).     
     Here, plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence from which an 
inference of a 
causal connection can be drawn.   Following his report to the human 
relations council, 
Aguiar received positive performance evaluations and merit pay increases 
until the time 
of his termination.  (District Court March 2, 2000 Opinion at 2).  When 
Aguiar requested 
a different position to accommodate his diabetes symptoms, defendant 
complied by 
offering him the only available position for which he was qualified, a 
paint prepper.  Id.  
Aguiar refused this position  even though Morgan offered to pay him his 
former higher 
salary  because he "didn't get along" with paint.   Id. at 3.  Because of 
his diabetes, 
plaintiff was granted intermittent FMLA leave from June 16, 1997 until 
July 14, 1997.  
When Aguiar failed to show up for work on July 14, Morgan's Employee 
Benefits 
Manager sent a letter to Aguiar's physician on July 16, 1997 requesting 
medical 
information explaining Aguiar's continued absence and "called every number 
we had for 
[Aguiar] to try and contact him and could not get a hold of him."  When 
the manager did 
not hear from Aguiar's physician after a week and a half (Whitmoyer Dep. 
108a), another 
human relations manager sent plaintiff a letter informing him that he was 
being 
terminated in accordance with the corporation's "no call/no show" policy.  
This 
termination occurred in July 1997   more than eight months after the 
meeting with the 
human relations council.   Aguiar has provided insufficient evidence of 
temporal 
proximity or a pattern of antagonism.  On these facts, we conclude 
plaintiff has not raised 
a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the causal connection 
between the alleged 
adverse employment actions and the protected activity.    
                             III.   
     For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed.  
